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A PROGRAMMING MODEL
FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
by
Stewart C. Myers and Gerald A. Pogue
I. INTRODUCTION
The theory of financial management now includes detailed con-
siderations of investment and financing decisions, of dividend policy,
and of most other aspects of corporate finance. But there is a clear
tendency to isolate these decisions in order to analyze them. To take
a simple example, consider the capital budgeting rules which depend
on an exogenous "cost of capital." These must assume that the firm's
financing decision is taken as given or is independent of the investment
decision, even though neither theory or practical considerations support
such a separation.
Financial management really requires simultaneous consideration
of the investment, financing, and dividend options facing the firm. The
purpose of this paper is to present a mixed-integer linear programming
model which includes these decisions and their interactions. The model is
based-on recent advances in capital market theory, but at the same time it
recognizes certain additional considerations that are manifestly important
to the financial manager. Thus, we believe that the model has both theoreti-
cal interest and the potential for practical application.
Before plunging into detail, it may be helpful to state the main
features of our approach in very general terms.
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The linear programming model follows from two propositions of
modern capital market theory, namely:
(1) That the risk characteristics of a capital investment oppor-
tunity can be evaluated independently of the risk character-
istics of' the firm's existing assets or other opportunities.
(2) The Modigliani-Miller result that the total market value of
the firm is equal to its unlevered value plus the present
value of taxes saved due to debt financing.
Thus, the firm is assumed to choose that combination of invest-
ment and financing options that maximizes the total market value of the
firm, specified according to the two axioms. The major constraints are
a debt limit (specified as a function of the value and risk characteristics
of the firm's assets and new investment) and a requirement that planned
sources and uses of funds are equal. In addition, there are constraints
on liquidity, dividend policy, investment choices (due to mutually ex-
clusive or contingent options), etc. We do not argue that every one of
these additional constraints will be relevant in a practical situation,
rather we have included them for the sake of completeness.
The model has several important features:
(1) The objective is specified in terms of the firm's market
value, not in terms of someone's utility function.
(2) There is no restriction on the risk characteristics of the
investment opportunities considered.
(3) The model does not rely on the weighted average cost of capital,
and thus avoids the difficulties associated with that concept.
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(4) .The model is linear in the decision variables, thus avoiding
the computational difficulties associated with non-linear
2
programming. It requires mixed integer programming for ~
solution, but practical size problems can be efficiently
handled with existing computer codes.
Of course no model for overall financial management can or
should be entirely original -- our contribution is the combination of in-
gredients, not the ingredients themselves. Our debt to many other
authors will be evident as we' present the model piece by piece.3
c
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II. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
The objective is to maximize the current market value of the
net worth of the firm, and thereby to maximize the wealth of current
shareholders. The market value of net worth at the beginning of period
t will be written as NWt, and the objective is thus to maximize NW1.
The firm is, of course, faced with certain immediate decisions.
But in general NW1 will also depend on future financing and investment
opportunities and the firm's future financial strategy. Thus, the problem
*is to find the optimal financial plan for the present (t = ) and for
future periods out to a horizon period (t = 2, 3, . . ., H).
Perfect capital markets will be assumed except for the imper-
fections specifically included in the model.
1: Decision Variables
We assume that management has identified a series of investment
opportunities, or projects, including both current and future opportunities.
The decision variables are:
1, if project k is accepted
xk 
0, if project k is rejected.
The firm also has the opportunity to place funds in liquid
assets (marketable securities):
Lt = dollar investment in liquid assetsat the start of
period t
The major financing decisions are the amount and type of debt issued,
the amount of equity issued, and total cash dividends paid. For the case of
debt,
Y P dollar value of debt issued at the start of t,
ti in risk class i.
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The second subscript on Y is needed because the risk of debt (to the
lender) depends on the firm's total debt obligation relative to its debt
capacity. T.us, the interest rate charged the firm will be a function
of the total debt issued. This is handled in the model by assuming that
the firm can issue a certain amount of prime debt (i = 1), but that to
issue more the firm must switch to medium grade (i 2), and so on. For
analytical convenience it is assumed that debt in each risk class is sub-
ordinate to debt of higher grades.
We could add a third' subscript to distinguish debt options by
their type and maturity. Clearly, management has to distinguish 5-year
from 20-year loans; but it might also be that a 5-year loan from a bank
has, say, a different repayment schedule from a 5-year note issued via an
underwriter. In order to simplify the presentation of the model we ignore
these considerations in this section of the paper, and assume that the firm
is concerned only with the total stock of debt outstanding in t, not its com-
position.
The decision variables for dividend and equity issues are
Et = amount of equity issued at the start of t
Dt ' dollar value of dividends paid at t.
There are a number of other variables in the objective functions --
various slack variables, for example, and also variables introduced to re-
flect the implicit costs of violating certain constraints. For example, man-
agement may wish to assign a cost to deviations from a target dividend pay-
ment. However, we will not discuss these variables further at. this point
since their rationale depends on the model's constraints.
--- ~ ~ _ ~ 1I__ _ __ _ X1 ~ _
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2. The Status Quo
Usually the firm will have existing assets and liabilities taken
as given for purposes of analysis. This is included in the model by speci-
fying certain "autonomous" variables which are forced into the solution. The
th
existing assets are treated as the 0 project, with X =-1. The existing
debt levels in various risk classes are given by Yi', where Yi is con-
strained equal to the actual debt outstanding in class i.
Similarly, D and L represent existing levels of dividend pay-
ments and liquid assets respectively.
3. Form of the Objective Function
In the most general sense the objective is to maximize W 1,
which is a function of the k's, Lt's, Y D t s and Et's. The prob-
lem is to specify NW1 as a linear function of these variables.
Investment Decisions
We will begin with the "base case" of (1) all-equity financing,
(2) no liquid assets, and (3) irrelevance of dividend policy. The third
condition is defined in the sense of the well-known Miller-Modigliani proof [11],
which in the present context implies that NW1 is independent of the
D 's and E 's. In this case we propose thatt t
N
NWI Xk Ak 4(2-1)
k=l
where Ak is the net present value of project k evaluated at the start of t = 1.
This specification rests on two assumptions. The first is "risk
independence," i.e., that risk characteristics of capital investment
-- - -, .'_ .... ... _ _ __ _ _ _ _ - '' - .. .; _ -, . ., T ---n l-·-
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opportunities can be evaluated independently of the risk characteristics
of the firm's existing assets or other opportunities. This means that
the market value of a portfolio of projects is equal to the sum of the -;
market values of the individual projects (assuming the projects could
be split off from the firm and separately financed). It also means that
diversification is more efficiently and flexibly accomplished within
investors' portfolios than within the firm.
There are several proofs that risk independence is a necessary
condition for equilibrium in perfect security markets.
The second assumption underlying Eq. (2-1) is the absence of
causal or "physical" interdependencies between project cash flows. Under
this assumption we must rule out competitive or complementary projects.
Obviously, if adoption of project j reduced the cash returns of project
k,'then would depend on X and Eq. (2-1) would not hold. However,
caosal interactions can be treated by introducing dummy projects whose
acceptance is contingent on adoption of the interacting projects. This
is discussed in detail later in the paper.
The important thing about Eq. (2-1), besides its linearity, is
that it makes no special assumptions about the risk characteristics of
investment projects. The manager computes A taking project k's risk
into account and then runs the model.
Of course, the model does not specicv how the value of each
investment opportunity is to be computed. For practical pruposes, we
propose
tCo( t
A Ck(t) (2-2)
t-l t-l(1 + P)
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where: O = the cost of capital for project k, assuming the basek
case of all-equity financing,dividend irrelevance, etc.
Pk is not a weighted average cost of capital.
Ck(t) = the expected after-tax cash flow from project k in t.
Ck(t) < 0 indicates a net cash outflow (investment). All
cash flows are assumed to occur at the beginning of
the period.
Debt Financing
Now we add the debt options:
N H II y F1
NW 1 OXk+ t:0 i YTi FTi
K 0 T= i=l
where F is the present value per dollar. of class i debt issued in T,
Ti
computed at the start of period 1. The variables for T 0 O refer to
the firm's existing debt.
Since the investment options are evaluated in terms of the base
case of all-equity financing, we must interpret Z YTi F as the in-
T i
crease in current net worth due to a planned shift from all-equity finan-
1,
cing to a mixed capital structure. Calculation of the FTi s must there-
fore be based on some theory of optimal capital structure. Although the
model does not rest on any particular theory (except for the assumption
of linearity) the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorn is the natural choice
since we have assumed perfect capital markets. MM state that the total
value of the firm is equal to its unlevered value plus the present value
of tax savings due to debt financing.6
%4
(2-3)
.. 
I
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This idea can be implemented in the present context by a simple
discounted present value calculation. To simplify exposition, we will
assume that the borrowing rates pi are expected to be constant during the
firm's planning horizon. In this section we are not concerned with the ma-
turity of debt issued, and we can analyze debt issued in t as if it had
to be repaid or refinanced in t + 17 Thus Yti is interpreted as the total
stock of "new" debt in class i that is outstanding from t to t + 1.
(There may also be "old," that is autonomous, debt still outstanding, denoted
by Y0i.) Then we can write down the after-tax cash flows and discount
these flows back to period 1 at Pi, the prevailing interest rate for class
i debt.
Thus,
1 fti(t) fti (t+l)
F (2-4)tt = (l+Pi) t-l (l+pi)t
where fi (t) is the general notation for the after-tax cash flows occurring
in t per dollar of class i debt issued in .
Equation (2-4) looks more complicated than it really is. The
immediate effect of issuing $1 of debt is a $1 cash inflow. Thus ft(t) = 1.
But there is a cash outflow the -next period which is to interest plus
principal repayment less the tax shield on interest. Thus,
fti(t + 1) = - (1+ pi) + T Pi
where TC is the marginal corporate tax rate. Discounting back to the
start. of period 1,
t . .. .~~~~~~.
· ___1_1_____ _____
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1 TCPi
F = (2-5)ti 1PL(1 + p )t
This is precisely the present value of tax savings due to $1 of class i
debt issue in t.
Eq. (2-5) rests on the assumption that the firm borrows at the
prevailing interest rate Pi, and the market capitalizes the tax shield
TC Pi at the same rate. This is reasonable since the firm can realizeC i
the tax shield only if the firm can pay the nterest. Thus the tax
9
shields and interest payments have similar risk characteristics.
Bankruptcy Costs
At this point we must recognize an issue left unclear in the
MM propositions. If the choice between debt and equity is irrelevant
except for tax savings, then why not finance with 99.99 percent debt?
In our opinion there is no simple response, but we can recognize three
10
limits that are practically important, namely (1) capital rationing,-
(2) managerial risk aversion and (3) bankruptcy costs. The first two
items would be reflected in debt capacity constraints (discussed below)
and do not affect the objective function. Bankruptcy costs, however, do
enter the objective function,
We interpret "bankruptcy costs" broadly, including not only the
costs of bankruptcy and reorganizations, but also any otherwise suboptimal
actions taken by the firm in order to avoid balL&ruptcy. The costs are re-
lated to planned debt commitments in the various debt classes.
For example,. assume the firm plans to have $1 of debt outstanding
in class 2, period 1. (Class i = 1 debt is assumed to be prime and thus leads
to low and perhaps negligible bankruptcy costs) We impute a cost of, say, $0.02.
·
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to this liability. This amount is the decline in the market value of the
firm due to the possibility of bankruptcy due to the debt commitment.ll
b
Th'n. general notation for these costs is pi(T), the present. 
value at the beginning of the planning horizon (t - 1) of bankruptcy costs
associated with $1 of class i debt outstanding in period T.
The penalty costs increase with i, since a move to a higher risk class of
debt by definition implies a greater chance of actual or near-bankruptcy.
Also, the period 1 present value will decline as T increases, according to 0
b
Pi(1)
pi(T) b (2-6)
(1 + gb)T-1
b
where g is a positive discount rate.
The actual values of the pi(T)'s will probably be estimated sutjectivel.
which is dangerous in that the model user may employ them as fudge factors.
We accept this danger in view of their practical importance.
Liquid Assets
We can now extend the model to include liquid assets. For
simplicity of presentation we assume liquid assets to be one-period risk-
less securities yielding a rate of return pL.
Consider a $1 investment at the beginning of period t which re-
turns $1 plus PL(1 - TC) after corporate taxes at the beginning of
period t + 1. The present value at the start of period 1 of this invest-
ment, AL, is given by
1 1.0 + pL(1-TC -TL1 - 01.0 L C C2L
A = +
tL (1+P 1 PLt (1+p)t (2-7)
~~( Pn tL (i+O L))
---------· (_II__· -----I^___________
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1Note that AtL will be negative for reasonable values of pL
and T The reason is that liquid assets are equivalent to negative debt:
1 1if L Pl, then AtL = -Ftl, as can be seen by comparing Eqs. (2-5)
and (2-7). The liquid assets create an additional tax rather than a
tax shield. The fact that debt and liquid assets have mutually offsetting
effects on NW means that L must be a bit less than p1 to insure that
the model has a determinant solution. However, this makes sense since
the liquid assets are considered riskless; whereas the first class of
debt, while "prime," is not absolutely risk free.
Dividend Policy and Equity Issues
If we now add dividend and equity issue decisions to the factors
already discussed, we have
K- ~N . H I
NW1 -Xk Ai+ E Y Ti [F Ti + P
k=O T=O i=l
(2-8)
H H H
+ E L A + E P e()E + Z P d(T)D
-o=0 Tl T
where the last two terms are the effects of planned equity issues and
dividend policy, respectively, on the market value of net worth.
The model does not rely on any specific theory of optimal
dividend policy, except for the assumption of linearity. However, the
natural starting point is again the MM theory. According to M's proof, 1 2
dividend policy is irrelevant (i.e., it does not affect shareholders'
wealth) assuming investment policy is given. Any change in dividend
payment can be offset by a change in the amount of equity issued cr
S
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shares repurchased, and the change in cash dividend received by the firm's
shareholders is exactly offset by a capital gain or loss due to the issue or
retirement of shares. In our model, this implies p (T) = pd(T) = 0. That is,
given values for the Xk's, the planned values of Et and Dt have no effecton NW1.
However, there is at least one market imperfection that cannot be
ignored: the transaction costs associated with new equity issues. Thus, we
e 13interpret p (T) as the cost per dollar of equity issued in period , with
e
pe(T) = p (l) (2-9)(l+ge T-1
e
The discount rate g reflects the fact that issue costs are better delayed,
simply because of the time value of money. Another complication is that total
issue costs are not a strict linear function of the amount of equity issued.
There is a substantial fixed cost associated with any issue, for example.
( . . Thus, we must turn to a piecewise linear function with Fe (T) representing the
fixed cost and v (T) the variable cost per dollar of equity issued. We also
e
require an equity issue decision variable, Zt, which takes the value zero if
no equity is issued in period t and one otherwise. This is discussed more
fully in the next section.
Although we know that equity issues are undesirable, it is less clear
how dividend increases affect NW1. Some would make p d(T) positive be-
cause of market imperfections or irrationality. We are more inclined to
the view that p () is negative due to unfavorable tax treatment of cash
dividends relative to capital gains income. That is, we interpret pd(T)
as the extra taxes paid by the firm's shareholders when they received a
dollar of cash income in T instead of a dollar of capital-gains.. However,
it is difficult to prove either view empirically.1 4
______-x -"-Lcl· 
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Informational Content of Dividends and Reported Earnings
There is one more consideration which enters into the objective
function. So far we have assumed that investors have access to the same
information about the firm's plans and prospects as do the firm's mana-
gers. This is often not true; consequently, we must interpret NW1 as
the intrinsic value of the firm's net worth, and recognize that the actual
market value may not equal NW1 when information is limited.
This sort of market imperfection makes it hard to specify the
firm's objective with absolute clarity. Nevertheless, it seems more
reasonable and natural to maximize intrinsic value than any evident
alternative. In fact, the large corporation -- providing limited liability
and a means for delegation of financial decision making authority -- seems
(i. a natural response, given the task of maximizing value in the face
of informational limitations.
The major difficulty arises when pursuit of intrinsic value
leads to systematically false signals. Suppose the firm undertakes a large
and attractive investment. It cuts the dividend payment to finance the
investment. The probable result is a temporary drop in stock price, since
the dividend cut will be interpreted as a sign of management pessimism
about future earnings. The price will stay at a depressed level until
the true situation comes to light, and in the meantime shareholders
may sell at unfairly low prices.
A related problem is that most large investments generate rela-
tively little reported income during an initial "start-up" period (which
may last several years). This does not necessarily indicate a poor in-
vestment decision, but rather a bias ;:n the calculation of accounting
%
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income. Thus, adoption of a project can generate a false signal con-
cerning the firm's long-run earnings.
There are basically two ways cr reacting to this sort of
problem. One is to tell the market the true cause for the low earnings
or dividend decrease. The other is to rearrange the firm's financial
decisions so as to maintain dividends and reported earnings. The
choice between these two strategies depends on the feasibility of the
former versus the cost of the latter.
In our model there are two sets of constraints which allow
management to "cost out" the policies of smoothing dividends and reported
(This follows Chambers [3a] and Lerner and Rapoport [8].)
earnings. / The constraints establish target dividend and reported earn-
de re
ings growth rates, gd and gr and impose penalties pj cT) and t if
( the target levels are not met.
p C(T) is the present value at the start of period 1 of
j
penalty costs associated with $1 of dividend cut in period . The pen-
alty depends on the amount of the cut in steps indicated by = 1,
·, P.
Similarly, p (T) is the cost as of period 1 per dollar
penalty class j reported earnings reduction in period T.
Summary
Now we can put all of these pieces tqgether. The objective
function is to maximize the intrinsic value of 'W 1, the firm's net worth,
evaluated at the start of t = 1. NW1 is the sum of
(1) The present value of the firm's investments evaluated assuming
perfect markets and all-equity financing.
'I
%
__1·__1_ __I __ _1___1_(__1_^__1_-
- 16 -
(2) Plus the net present value of investments in liquid assets.
(3) Plus the present value of debt financing versus all-equity
final,cing, due to tax savings, net of bankruptcy costs.
present value of transaction
(4) Minus the posta:-of planned equity issues (fixed plus variable
costs).
present value of
(5) Minus the/tax penalties associated with dividend payments.
(6) Minus penalties assessed when target growth rates for dividends
and reported earnings are not met.
The next section presents a detailed discussion of the decision
variables and constraints associated with the various net worth penalty
costs. Following this we present a complete algebraic expression for
the objective function.
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III. THE CONSTRAINTS
As discussed above, the goal of financial planning is to select
a financial plan which will maximize the value of the shareholder's equity.
The financial plan consists of a set of investment and financing decisions
covering the planning horizon of the firm. In this section we define the
restrictions on the set of feasible plans. These constraints can be
grouped into six categories, as follows.
(1) Cash flow constraints, insuring that planned sources and uses of
funds are equal.
(2) Debt capacity: these constraints limit the amount of debt the firm can
issue in various risk classes.
(3) Liquidity reserve: these constraints ensure that sufficient "slack"
exists in the financial plan to provide protection against the un-
certainties associated with projected cash requirements. The "slack"
takes the form of a liquidity reserve, composed of unused borrowing
capacity plus the liquid assets held by the firm.
(4) Investment restrictions: these constraints are necessary to allow
physical dependencies among projects.
(5) Equity issue costs: these constraints are necessary to represent the
costs associated with new equity issues.
(6) Information effects: these constraints represent the costs associated
with "erratic" dividends and reported earnings.
We now proceed to a detailed discussion of each of the constraint
types. To assist the reader, a summary of notation is given in Table 3-1.
1.. Expected Sources and Uses Constraints
For every feasible financial plan, expected cash requirements
in each period must be exactly matched by sources of funds. Thus,
1______1_ _ __11____
_ __I____
_II____I _·.ll-CI(..- -- ------- -X----- ·--I ------
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Table 3-1
Summary of Major Variables Used
1. Decision Variables
Xk Project zero-one decision variable, k 0, 1, . . ., N.
Lt Stock of liquid assets in period t, t = 0, .. ., H.
Y ~i Amount of risk class i debt issued in period T.
YTi
'T = O 1, . .., H; i 1, . . ., I.
Et Amount of equity issue in period t.
e
Zt Equity zero-one decision variable.
i
Dt Aggregate dividends paid in period t.
d
Amount of penalty class dividend reduction in period T.
TJ
Qua Amount of penalty class j reported earnings reduction in period T.
2. Parameters: Investment Options
Present value at t of project k.
tt 1
OAk Standard deviation of k; OAk =0, however.
Yt k
kt Correlation coefficient between Ak and AO .
Ck(t) Period t after-tax cash flows.
t
Cck(t) Cumulative cash flows to period t, i.e., Z Ck(t)
t-1
.
Ill
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Table 3-1 (Continued)
Cck(t) Standard deviation of C k(t).
Ykt Correlation coefficient between Cck(t) and Cc(t)
.
ok Discount rate for project k, assuming all- equity financing.
tREk Contribution of project k to reported earnings in year t.
A Present value at t per dollar of L.
PL Rate of return on liquid assets, before tax.
3. Parameters: Financing Options
t
F Present value at t per dollar of class i debt issued in T.FTi
f{i(t) After-tax period t cash flow per dollar of class i debt issued
in T.
aTi Dollars outstanding in t per dollar of class i debt issuedT i
in T.
Sit Stock of class i debt in period t.
Zit
Pi
Maximum amount of class 1 through i debt in period t.
Interest rate on class i debt.
V
__I   Ul_rl_ _______
- 20
Table 3-1 (Continued)
4. Parameters: Net Worth
NWt Net worth at t.
TAt Total assets at t.
o(NWt) Standard deviation of NWt.
a(TAt) Standard deviation of TAt
5. Parameters: Penalty Costs
All penalty costs are present value as of the start of period t.
b
Pti()
v t (T)
t( r)
d 
Ptj(T)
Bankruptcy costs per dollar of risk class i debt outstanding
in period T .
Variable issue costs per dollar of equity issued in period T
Fixed cost of equity issued in period T
Tax penalty per dollar of dividend payments in period T
Penalty cost per dollar of period T dividend reduction
(penalty class j)
Penalty cost per dollar of period T reported earnings reduction
(penalty class j) .
Target dividend growth rate.
Target reported earning growth rate.
-.-.lfl- -
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expected sources and uses of cash must net to zero in each decision
period. That is,
After tax cash After tax cash Net proceeds
flow from + flow from debt + of equity
projects options issued
Dividends Increase in
-- = 0paid liquid assets
Stated in terms of the specific decision variables, this relationship
becomes, for each period t = 1, . .. , H,
N t I
1 Y fo(t) (3-1)Xk Ck(t) + Z Ti fTi(t) (3-1)k=O T=O i=l
+E - Vt (t)] - ZetFt (t) - Dt - [Lt (1 + (1-T)L) Ltl] = 0
Note that the cash flows from the firm's existing projects and debt fi-
nancing are included in the equation as X 0 and Yi'
2. Debt Capacity Constraints
The amount and quality of the debt a firm can issue obviously depends on
the nature of its assets. The more claims the firm issues againts its
assets, the lower the quality (rating) of these claims and the higher the
rate of interest demanded by lenders.
We assume that the firm can issue claims in I successively riskier
debt classes. Thus, we must limit the amount of debt that the firm can
issue in each risk class to the amount acceptable to the
 - --^---·- -·-"··-""·^1-·---
. A.
- 22 -
market. In practical terms we are placing limits on the amount of
debt the firm can issue in the various bond rating categories, such as
AAA, AA, etc.
The approach used to structure the debt limit constraints
is to assume that the market will accept additional debt in a given
risk class (quality rating)'up to the point where the probability
that the firm could "get into trouble" reaches an unacceptable level.
We define trouble as a situation in which the real value of the firm's
assets is less than the book value of its liabilities. Thus, the debt
outstanding in each risk class must be limited to a raction of the
expected market value of total assets in each future period. The size of the
fraction will depend on the degree of uncertainty about the future
value of the firm's assets.
This is illustrated in Figure 3-1. The figure shows the distribu-
tion of- the market value of the firm's total assets at the beginning of period
t of the planning horizon. The Zlt and Z2t are the limits for class 1 debt
and class 1 plus class 2 debt, respectively. Total assets equal the sum
of the net worth (NWt) plus the stock of class 1 and class 2 debt
outstanding. In general, there would be i values of Zit, one for each
debt class.
The amount of risk class i debt 'outstanding in period t
is obtained by summing the amounts outstanding from issues in periods
150 (initial debt) through t. That is,
t
S E Y (3 -2)it ri ' TiTWO
"I/
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Figure 3-1
Debt Limit Based on the Uncertainty
About the Future Value of the Firm's Assets
P(TAt )
Probability of
"Trouble"
l
I
Expected Total Assets
NWt + Sit + Szt
Value of
Total
Assets
___l___ll____*_IC__) 
__I__..
-----.I_ ___DC____I-_.__lliCIIIIII___ 
___
II
I
*1
-It
0 .
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The amount of debt outstanding in each risk class is.
limited to a portion of expected total assets. The appropriate frac--
tion is obtained by restricting the amount of debt in the first i classes
such that the probability of "trouble" is equal to the maximum allowable
value. That is,
P(TAt < Zt) = i (3-3)
where Zit is the dollar limit on the first i classes of debt. In
principle, the probability limit ci is determined from the behavior of
the debt markets. We use ci and the statistical properties of TAt to
solve for the debt limit, Zti
From Eq. (3-3),
E(TAt) Zti + ki (TAt ) (3-4)
-1
where ki is equal to F (ci), F being the cumulative probability distri-
16
bution for TAt . Thus,t
ti E(TAt) - ki (TAt), (3-5)
I
where E(TAt) = E[NWt] + Z Sit (3-6)
i=l
2 2 2 t
and (TA) = (NW) = a(A)
where At is the present value of the firm's portfolio of investment
p
projects in period t. Now
2 ipl' N N
(A) XkXkCov(, k
k-0 k'=O
11
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which is, of course, non-linear in the X's. However,
where Ykt is the correlation coefficient between A and t.
Therefore, CyTA XkCov). ( NN
Eq. (3-7) does not really eliminate non-linearities in the specification
of 2(~At ), since Yk depends on the projects accepted and thus is nott~t0 p
available ex ante. However, it is a tolerable linear approximation if
we can assume that the correlation between and At is equal to that
bhe present value of the firm's assets existing at
t 0(3-7) Thidoes is realistic if the firnonm's investment opportunificaties do not
call for v depentures inthe projects accepted aind thustries, or if such ventures
are small relative to the existing assets and other opportunities.
Substituting Eqs. (3-6)and (3-7) into (3-5) we have
I
Zti I E[NWt] + Z S -t k XYka ) (3-8)
with k > k for all i. The =l on class i debt can now be expressed
with ki1 > k i for all i. The limit on class i debt can now be expressed
as - Sit + W = Zit -z (3-9)
where Wit is the unused class i-debt capacity in period t.
______^_I ___I · _I^_II_1_1_UII___IL----_llll-··----
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3. Liquidity Reserve
The sources and uses equations are stated in terms of
expectations. However, given the uncertainties associated with project
cash flows, planned sources may be insufficient to meet actual cash re-
quirements in future time periods,. For any real firm, both management
and stockholders would wish to ensure that a sufficiently large liquidity
buffer is built into the financial plan to provide a degree of flexi-
bility in the face of uncertainties associated with future cash flows.
The liquidity reserve (LR) is composed of liquid assets plus unused
borrowing potential,
I
LRt = L + Z Witi=l
(3-10)
The various components which make up future cash require-
ments were enumerated in Eq. (3-1). For purposes of this model, we
assume that uncertainty is confined to project cash flows, k(t).
The constraint implied by the liquidity reserve require-
ment is given by
PROB(R t < CSt + LRt) > l- (3-11)
where Rt the cumulative project cash requirements to period t
(a random variable);
CS -. the cumulative financing cash flows to period t (a
deterministic variable), and
et - the maximum acceptable probability of having insufficient
·cash available in periods 1 through t.
The constraint is formulated on a cumulative rather than a noncumulative
basis so that the statistical relationship among the period-by-period
III
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project cash flows can be explicitly considered. Also, the cumulative
formulation avoids the problem of double-counting the same liquidity e-
serve against liquidity requirements in several periods.
From equation (3-11),
CSt + LRt -E(CR t) > hta(CRt), (3-12)
where h is equal to F (l-et ), F being the cumulative probability dis-t t
tribution for CRt. However, from equation (3-1) planned requirements
E(CRt) are equal to planned sources CSt; thus, (3-12) becomes
LRt > h (CRt),
or
I
LRt - Lt + E Wit .> hta(Rt).
iMl t t
(3-13)
It now remains
the uncertainties of the
to develop
cumulative
an expression for (CRt) in terms of
project cash flows. By definition
CRt
Therefore,
where ECk(t)
-
6kt
S
N
E Xk(t) 
k-O
N
a(Rk) - k Xkakt [Cck(t)],k=O
= the cumulative after tax cash flows for periods 1
through t for project k, and
- the correlation coefficient between C (t) and CR.
We approximate Ykt by the correlation etween Ckit)
and the autonomous cash flows CCO(t), using the
same reasoning: applied to -k in Eq. (3-7),
I(_ ______ 
__ 111^----·1
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Finally, the expression for the liquidity reserve becomes
I N
t + it > h t C Xk kta(Ck(t))i=l k=0
(3-14)
tJ
Of course, Eq. (3-14) fs in some respects similar to Eqs. (3-8),
which limit planned debt levels. Both types of constraint protect the
firm from overcommitment in the face of uncertainty. But the constraints
are conceptually and practically different. The debt capacity con-
straints insure long-run solvency, but liquidity is by definition a short
run concept. Thus, Eqs. (3-14) preserves flexibility rather than n-
solvency, The size of the liquidity reserve is critical only for
the first few periods of the plan, in which management's ability to re-
spond to unexpected events is limited. A reasonable means of reflecting
this in the model is to let ht approach zero as t approaches H, the
horizon period.
Naturally, the definition of "short run" depends on the charac-
teristics of the firm's business, in particular the speed and cost of
revising investment plans and the predictability of future investment op-
17
portunities.
4. Investment Project Constraints
The possibility that various interdependencies will exist among
the investment projects requires the inclusion of additional constraints
in the model. The most common interdependencies are mutual exclusion,
contingency relationships, and physical dependencies between project
cash flows.
-~~~~~~~ --- ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~·-- . --·; · - - -- - -. I 1 1-. .
-29 -
If projects and k are mutually exclusive, then the constraint
xj + , < (3-15)
will ensure that only one project is accepted. (Remember that xj and xk
are constrained to integer values.) This type of constraint can also
be used to consider the possibility of accepting the same project now
or at some later time.
If project can be undertaken only if project k is accepted,
the constraint is
Xj C Xk (3-16)
Physical dependencies between project cash flows occur when
the cash flows associated with project j depend on whether project k is
accepted, or vice versa. Pairwise physical dependencies can be handled
by introducing a dummy project, w, which is included in the solution if
and only if both projects j and k are accepted. Thus X - 1 whenever
Xj = 1, and 0 otherwise.
1
Let A represent the incremental present value obtained if
both projects J and k are accepted. A may be positive or negative.
w
When A is positive, the model's "instinct" will always be to
w
include project w. It is constrained from doing so by making the ac-
ceptance of project w contingent on the acceptance of both and k. That
is,
X < Xk and X < X (3-17)
When A is negative, the following constraint is required:W I
__I_ __
____________...-Y-,-...
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X > Xj + Xk - (3-18)
That is, whenever Xj - = - 1, X must so80 equal 1.
Generalization of the treatment of physical dependencies to
higher order relationships is straightforward. Suppose project w
represents the effect of joint acceptance of M projects. If is
W
positive, then
< Xj, j 1, . .. , M (3-19)
If A is negative,then
M
X > Xj- (M + 1). (3-20)
An additional cause of project interdependencies results whnen
special resources used by several projects are rationed. The firm may
have a limited supply of managers to assign to the various projects
under consideration. Forexample} let
'd the amount of the scarce resource required by
project j (e.g., the number of managers required)
D - the total supply of the resource available.
Then if m projects compete for the scarce resource, total usage must be
limited to the amount D.
m
djXj < D. (3-21)
c . -. 
I
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5. Equity Issue Costs Constraints
Equity issue costs are composed of a fixed component F (T)
and a variable component v(T). For simplicity the variable cost rate
is assumed to be independent of the issue size. The issue cost re-
sulting from Et dollars of equity issued in period t is
ee eZt Ft (t) +.Et Vt (t),
e
where Zt is equal to zero of Et equals zero, and one otherwise. To
insure this relationship we required
Et < Zt (3-22)
10 e
where is a large number (e.g. 10 ). Thus, when Z is equal to zero,
t
e
Et = 0, and when Zt = 1 the values of Et are not limited by the con-
straint.
The market value of assets in period t, NWt, will include
the present value of (at t) all future equity issue costs. The expres-
sion for NWt will thus include the terms
H
[Z t
~~~t 
...I----.------·------------ ,  --------·--·---···---------
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6. Informational Constraints
These constraints are used in the calculation of penalties
to be applied to the firm's net worth resulting from erratic dividend
and reported earnings policies. The effect of the constraints is to
induce the model to smooth dividend payments and reported earnings over
time. The formulation of the constraints for dividends and reported
earnings are similar. Thus, we shall not provide a detailed treatment of
both. Let D = the aggregate dividends paid in year t (t 0, 1,
· H)
gd ~ the expected long-run growth rate of dividends.
The difference between the dividends paid and the target level
is equal to (1 + gd) Dt 1 Dt. The impact on the market price of the
firm's stock will increase with the magnitude of the reduction. Thus,
the difference can be divided into steps which will be penalized at
successively higher rates. 8
We begin by dividing any decrease in aggregated dividend pay-
d
ments into increments, At.tj
P
(1 + gd)Dt-l - Dt - Z tj (3-23)j1.
t 1, . . ., H
where AD is the amount of dividend reduction n the jth penalty classtj
( - 1, . . ., P). Note that if Dt > (1 + gd)Dtl then Atj will equal
zero for all values of j. The model assumes that dividend increases
beyond the target level are neither rewarded nor penalized.
- -- - ____ __ _ ~ ---_ _ _ L -. - · I III- 11 - ---- -, -__ -- -_ --- ---
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The amount of dividend reduction in each penalty class is lim-
ited to a specific fraction of the base dividend level. The first penalty
class is for dividend increases less than the expected value, the rest
d
for dividend reductions. Thus, Atl < gdDt_ , and for j - 2, . . ., P,
ddti < GDt-l (3-24)
tj _ jt-l
where 0j > 0 and ZO = 1. The concave shape of the penalty function
ensures that Ad reaches its upper bound before Ad takes on positive
H P d dct
values. NWt will include the term Z Z Atj Pt ) to reflect the
T-t j=l 
market value penalty associated with dividend reductions.
The penalty costs associated with reductions in reported earn-
ings are treated in the same manner. Reported earnings in period i are
given by
N t I
REt k O Xk · REkt + Lt_- dL(t) Z Z YTidi( ) (3-25)
~t k=O Xk=O i Tl
where REt 3 contribution to reported earnings of project k in year t;
dL(t) after-tax interest rate received in period t per dollar
of liquid assets held during period t-l, and
dTi(t) 3 after-tax interest payments in period t per dollar of
risk class i debt issued in period T.
The target reported earnings in period t are equal to (1 + gR)REt 1
Any decrease in expected earnings from the target level can be divided
reinto segments A which are penalized at successively higher rates.ti
Q 1(r(1 + g )RE - RE < (3-26)g)r t-1 t i tjlj=1
%
_____11__^___1___ __^_1_1__
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Where, as in the dividend case,
rtl
Atl < grREt_l
A r
t < aREt-1 J-2, . . ., Q
j> .
The net worth in period t will be reduced by an amount
H Q
z £ Ar re
T=t =ltj t
reflecting the reporting-earnings reduction penalties.
Model Summary
We can now present a complete algebraic expression for the
net worth in period t.( .
N
k=O
H
+ Z L At
'r=t t T
H I
+ £ Z YTi
T-0 il
Ft
,ti
H. I
+ E S Pt (T)
T=t i=l
H
+ 
%rt
[Z F(t) + E v t(T) ]
Present value in period t of
project and autonomous cash flows
Present value of liquid assets held
during periods t through H
Present value of financing options
Present value of bankruptcy costs
Present value of equity issue costs
H
+ DTP ()
t t
Present value of dividend tax penalty
I
(3-27)
NWt
ill
--·111
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H P d dc
+ E A P )
T=t j tj tj
H Q
+ . Q Ar re (C)
Tt j= TJ PtjTrt J~l
Present value of dividend reduction
penalties
Present value of reported earnings
reduction penalties
The objective of the model is to maximize the net worth at
the beginning of period 1, NW1. The major constraints on the decision
variables are,
(a) Sources and Uses of Cash
N t I
' ~Ck(t) E YTi f i ( t )
k=O =O T i
{+ Et[1 - v t(t)] F(t) - Pt
t t t
(3.1)
- Lt - (1 + (1 - T) )Lt}
(b) Debt Capacity
- Stock of class i debt in period t
Sit
t
W E = d
-i-
(3.2)
- Limit for class i debt
Sit + Wit = Zit - Zi-lt (3.9)
for all values of i.
I
.
_I____ __
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(c) Liquidity Reserve
I N
L +EW > >htE a tLt wit- t _ Xk kt (Cck(t))i=1 k=O
(d) Project Constraints
- positive interaction (A > 0)
w
X < X j - , . . ., M
w - J
- negative interaction (A < 0)
M
x > x -
w - i J
(3.13)
(3.19)
(3.20)(M + 1)
(e) Equity Issue Costs
Et < Zt · (3.22'
(f) 'Information Effects
- dividend cuts
P ( g)D1D d (3.23:'
- (1 + gd)Dtl Dt < Z t
--1 tj
d
where Atj < j . Dj 1 (3.24'
- reported earnings reductions
Q
(1 + gr) REt_- RE t < (3.26
i-i tj
r
where At < aj REt_ (3.27
Each of the above constraints must hold for values of t from to the
)
)
)
)
horizon period H.
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IV. INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND HORIZON CONDITIONS
Two important aspects of the model remain to be discussed
-- the completeness of the investment opportunity set and the conditions
at the end of the planning horizon.
Investment opportunity set
Thus far we have implicitly assumed that all investment
projects to be considered during the planning horizon can be identified
in project by project detail at the beginning of the planning period. As
a practical matter, this is impossible. While the financial manager
may be able to describe all potential investment projects in the early
years of the planning horizon, this will not be the case for the later
periods. At most, he will be able to describe the aggregate nature of
yet-to-emerge opportunities.
In the absence of interdependencies among various investment and
financing decisions, there would be no need for additional information about
these opportunities; however, the sort of interdependencies discussed in
this paper makes it impossible to ignore them, since the
likelihood of future opportunities will influence current investment and
financing decisions.
A practical solution is to define a series of yet-to-emerge
investment projects, one for each year of the planning horizon, from t-2
to t=H. These would represent the financial managers' best guesses as
to the new opportunities that will eventually arise for those years. The
magnitude, risk and duration of the cash flows would probably reflect
extrapolations of previous investment experience. The amount
of potential investment opportunities would likely increase for
___________ ·I a. · -- I L-l.-`--- 
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later periods in the planning horizon, complementing the managers'
declining detailed knowledge of specific projects. The result of this
approach is to permit the delay of commitments to specific future proj-
ects until later when more information becomes available.
To include these projects in the model, we define a series
of decision variables XN+t-l' for t=2, . . ., H. These variables are
continuous rather than discrete, allowing fractions of the total of
projected opportunities to be included in the financial plan. Other-
wise, these projects would be treated identically to the N identified
projects.
By including these projects we have prevented the apparent
"disappearance" of the firm in later periods due to the absence of speci-
fic projects. Without them the first period decisions would be biased by
the apparent short life of the firm. For example, if future opportunities
were ignored, the debt capacity of the firm would appear to decline and
the model would be forced to plan for early retirement of debt.
Horizon Conditions
Another set of problems arise from the fact that the model
looks ahead only a finite number of periods, whereas the firm will con-
tinue to exist well beyond that time. It is thus necessary to consider
how the myopic nature of the model effects the recommended financial
plan. That is, what biases will result in the plan from the finite
nature of the model, and how can they be corrected? Ideally, we would
like to interface the model with the periods beyong the horizon so that
decisions are made as if the planning horizon were infinite.
Ill
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One problem arises when the model is extended to cover the
choice among debt maturities. In this case there will be issues with
repayment schedules extending beyond the horizon. Since longer ma-
turity debt options have higher net present values per dollar issued,
and since there are no debt capacity constraints beyond t=H, the model
will use maximum maturity options for financing extending beyond the
horizon. Thus, the horizon debt structure will be artificially
biased toward longer maturities.
To remove this bias we truncate all debt issued at the be-
ginning of period H+1. Thus, all debt extending beyond the horizon
is assumed to mature at the beginning of period H+1, even though the
interest rates are for longer maturity periods. With this change the
debt option net present values F (j is the coefficient for maturity
and type) will no longer bias the model toward longer-maturity instruments.
Truncation of debt at the planning horizon, however, will
result in a bias against longer-lived projects. This results from
eliminating th.e benefits of post horizon debt capacity, which will be
largest for longer lived projects.
The solution clearly requires an approximization for the
value of the post-horizon debt capacity related to each project. One
way to do this is to discount project k's post horizon expected cash
flows back to t=l at a weighted average cost of capital k' while con-
tinuing to discount pre-horizon flows at Pk, the appropriate rate
assuming all-equity financing. Specifically, we replace Eq. (2-2) with:
H c
1 C(T)
Ai E + Z t.- (4.1)
T=l (+Pk) T=H+l (l+pk)
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where k is the weighted average cost of capital for the project. We
(from [15]) *
use the MM formula/to obtain k from k and Xk, a target debt ratio for
the project:
Pk P 0k(l - TXk). (4.2)
The effect of discounting pk rather than pk is to increase the present
value of post horizon cash flows (assuming Xk positive), thereby reflect-
ing-the proJect's contribution to post-horizon debt capacity. This
method is not exact, but the errors introduced should not be serious in
19
the present context.
Beyond period H, and after the lifetimes of the yet-to-emerge
projects discussed above, we assume that the firm enters a steady state.
In this condition, it is assumed to invest in projects which make no
contribution to net worth. While it would be conceptually possi-
ble to specify the nature of post-horizon growth opportunities, in
practice this would be a nebulous affair. Also, given their re-
moteness, the effect on current decisions will tend to be small.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our purpose was to develop a model which would permit simultan-
eous consideration of the investment, financing and dividend options fac-
ing the firm. Financial theory has typically treated these as independ-
ent decisions. However, this has been at the cost of ignoring a number of
important interactions. The main considerations which lead to a requirement
for simultaneous solution are:
III
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\ . (1) Corporate Debt Capacity, which depends on the total risk charac-
teristics of the asset portfolio and not on individual projects
per se.
(2) Liquidity requirements, based on the uncertainty of aggregate
portfolio cash flows.
(3) Fixed costs associated with equity issues.
(4) Project interdependencies and resource constraints.
(5) Informational problems associated with dividend and reported
earnings policies.
These considerations are present in most practical situations.
Given this, it is not possible to maximize the value of the firm through
simple sequential determination of investment, financing and dividend
decisions. Our approach has incorporated these interactions and uses
mathematical programming to obtain the jointly optimal set of decisions.
The approach has a number of distinct advantages in addition
to the simultaneous nature of the solution. The major ones are:
(1) There are no restrictions on project risk characteristics. The
model allows explicit treatment of project risk differences in both
the objective function and constraints.
(2) Debt capacity is based on project risk characteristics and not on
arbitrarily determined debt equity ratios.
(3) The liquidity reserve is similarly based on the risk of project
cash flow, and not on rules of thumb.
(4). The model uses mixed integer linear programming
in order to avoid the fractional project difficulties associated
I
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with ordinary linear programming. Computationally
efficient codes exist for practical size problems.
The model formulation has a number of minor problems and one more sig-
nificant difficulty.
(1) Minor problems result from the assumptions necessary to maintain
the linear structure of the debt capacity and liquidity reserve
constraints. Also, penalties associated with dividend and reported
earnings reductions are on an aggregate rather than per share
basis to avoid the non-linearities associated with per share cal-
culations. The latter is only a problem during periods when new
equity is issued.
(2) The more serious problem results from the non-sequential nature of
the model. The model treats the problem as a single rather than multi-
stage decision problem. That is, the model develops a complete
financial plan at the beginning of the planning horizon rather
than a set of decision rules which will guide the course of the plan
as new information becomes available. Thus, decisions for periods
2 through H do not reflect the opportunity to obtain new informa-
tion at the end of period 1, and hence will no longer be op-
timal when new information is received at the end of period 1. Of
course, there is no need actually to implement these decisions, since the
model can be re-run at the beginning of each year to produce an up-
dated financial plan.
Cf
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Myers [17] for a detailed treatment of the weighted average cost
of capital and the errors that can retult from its use.
2. There are some minor exceptions (noted in Section III below) where
approximations must be made to maintain the linear structure.
3. In addition to specific references later in the paper, we must note
here our general reliance on several authors' work.
The basic linear programming framework for financial planning
under certainty was laid by Charnes, Cooper and Miller [3].
Weingartner 24) extended this approach to capital budgeting decisions,
and Ngslund [18] made progress in extending the Weingartner model to
conditions of certainty.
The financing side of the model relies heavily on Modigliani and
Miller's treatment of capital structure and dividend policy. [11,12,133
K. Although the analysis of the risk of investment projects is exo-
genous to the model, the model does rely on the nation of risk inde-
pendence introduced by Myers [15]. As Fama [4) and Hamada note [6],
risk independence also holds approximately in the capital asset
pricing model of Sharpe [23], Lintner [10] and Mossin [14].
Of course,. other optimization models have been proposed for finan-
cial planning,. but the ones we have seen (examples are Carleton [2],
Chambers [3a] and Moses [5)) do not share the essential features of
the model we are presenting here. By "essential features" we have
in mind particularly our reliance on modern capital market theory,
our treatment of risk differences among investment opportunities, and
our specification of debt capacity and liquidity constraints.
4. That is, it is assumed that the average interest rate with subordination
is the same, ceteris paribus, as if one undifferentiated class of debt
were issued. This seems to be a reasonable approximation given the
intent of the model. See Robichek and Myers [211, pp. 31-32 for a
theoretical justification.
-·--~~--~~~-·-~~--  ----- -
Footnotes 2
5. See Myers [151, and Schall [.22]. The latter provides a review of
the literature on this subject.
The risk-independence concept, usually advanced with the firm's
investment decision in mind, applies to the financing decision as
well. (That is, the proofs apply to transactions either in real or
financial assets.) Thus, this concept also supports our use of a
linear objective function with respect to security issues and retirements.
6. See Modigliani and Miller [13], and Robichek and Myers [21].
7. For ease of exposition this one period debt assumption will be main-
tained throughout Section II. In later sections the discussion will
be generalized to debt of fixed, multi-period maturity.
8. There are no conceptual difficulties in expanding Eq. (2-4) to cover
various maturities, changing interest.rates across maturities and
time, etc.
9. Of course, this assumes that T is known, that the firm will have
taxable income in all future periods, etc. It also assumes the firm
always borrows at the going rate Pi. If this was not true for some
reason (example: government-subsidized fincnaing) then the present value
of the debt option would be computed from Eq. (2-4) rather than (2-5).
10. For discussion, see Jaffee and Modigliani [7] and the other sources
cited there.
11. Note that the bankruptcy costs are not due to imperfections in the
(secondary) securities markets. Rather, they are real costs (e.g.,
lawyer's fees) deducted from the firm's assets in the event of bank-
ruptcy. Thus, the introduction of bankruptcy costs here does not con-
flict with our reliance on perfect capital markets, the idea of
risk independence or with MM's bsic approach to the analysis of financ-
ing decisions.
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Footnotes 3
12. Miller and Modigliani [11], esp. pp. 412, 415. The proof was in-
dependently presented by Lintner [9]; however, Lintner feels it appli-
cability is much more limited than M do.
13. These costs may also reflect the clientele effect stressed by
Lintner [9].
14. See Black and Scholes [1] for recent tests and references to earlier
work.
15. For the one period debt case the stock of class i debt outstanding
is given by
t
it = oi Yoi + Yti
16. ki can be determined by assuming TAt is normally distributed, or from
a nonparzmetric relationship such as Tchebyscheff's inequality.
17. The need for the explicit inclusions of a liquidity reserve constraint
results from the single-stage nature of the model. Specifically,
the sources and uses constraints for t=l, . .. , H are based on ex-
pected (as of t=0) cash requirements. The liquidity reserve is re-
quired to insure that sufficient cash sould be available to meet the
actual requirements in period 2 and beyond. Without this reserve,
additional costs (not considered in the current objective function)
would be incurred in raising additional cash to meet the unanticipated
requirements. If the model had been formulated as a multi-stage de-
cision problem, explicit recognition would have been taken of the
requirements that could arise beyond the first period. The
optimal financial plan would then have build in liquidity reserves
to protect against higher than expected cash requirements. However,
for practical reasons, as well as ease of exposition we have chosen
not to follow te multi-stage approach. The data and computational re-
quirements for a full blown multi-stage approach are typically prohibi-
tive for problems of practical size. From an exposition point of view
formulating
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Footnotes 4
the model as a multi-stage linear programming problem would
simply add detail which would obscure discussion of the basic
issues. This approach is identical to that used by Pogue and
Bussard in their short term planning model [19].
18. Another approach to smoothing dividends and reported earnings is
commonly usad in analytical planning models (see, for example,
Lerner and Rappaport [8]). It involves simply constraining aggregate
values in each period to equal or exceed one plus the target growth rate
times the value in the previous period. The costs of these con-
straints are then evaluated through an examination of the relevant shadow
prices.
Our approach allows the model to "price out" reductions in divi-
dends and reported earnings. However, the simpler approach may be
more appealing in some applications.
19. See Myers [17], pp. 25-32.
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